Tốt cho cả thế giới và cả Mỹ ?- Cảm ơn Mafiovi : No More Superpower?
America’s global dominance appears to be fading. Is this a good thing for the world, and the United States? Seven prominent world-watchers give their views.
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER
Professor of international affairs at Princeton
Derek Shapton
America’s ability to direct or control global or even regional events is declining, but so too is the ability of every other nation. The world itself has changed, from a closed to an open system. In closed systems, events are predictable and linear. In an open system, as Capt. Wayne Porter and Col. Mark Mykleby argue in “A National Strategic Narrative for the United States,” very small perturbations create very large and nonlinear results. The self- immolation of a vegetable seller in Tunisia sets off a conflagration that brings down governments across the Arab world. The Federal Reserve’s decision to let one investment bank fail nearly brought the global financial system to a complete stop.
Of course, the world of foreign affairs was never truly closed, but the bipolar world of the Cold War was closed enough to sustain the illusion of control. That illusion is forever shattered, or should be. In an open system, notions of primacy or even dominance are nonsensical. The best the United States can hope for is ‘‘credible influence,’’ the ability to guide other nations through the appeal of our values, the power of our example, and the strength of our economy and political system.To build up that influence, we must invest less in our military and more in diplomacy and de- velopment, less in protectionism and more in competitiveness, less in strutting on the world stage and more in living up to our values. That is the right narrative for the coming decades. But all is hardly lost. Even today, in the chaos of an open system, the United States is still the most influential power in the world. Let us review some of the things that would probably not have happened just over the past two years without U.S. participation: The creation of the G-20. The conclusion of a Climate Ac- cord in Copenhagen. A nuclear arms treaty with Russia. The rebuff of Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. U.N. intervention in Libya. Still, the paradox remains. To maintain its influence abroad, the United States must renew itself at home.
Of course, the world of foreign affairs was never truly closed, but the bipolar world of the Cold War was closed enough to sustain the illusion of control. That illusion is forever shattered, or should be. In an open system, notions of primacy or even dominance are nonsensical. The best the United States can hope for is ‘‘credible influence,’’ the ability to guide other nations through the appeal of our values, the power of our example, and the strength of our economy and political system.To build up that influence, we must invest less in our military and more in diplomacy and de- velopment, less in protectionism and more in competitiveness, less in strutting on the world stage and more in living up to our values. That is the right narrative for the coming decades. But all is hardly lost. Even today, in the chaos of an open system, the United States is still the most influential power in the world. Let us review some of the things that would probably not have happened just over the past two years without U.S. participation: The creation of the G-20. The conclusion of a Climate Ac- cord in Copenhagen. A nuclear arms treaty with Russia. The rebuff of Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. U.N. intervention in Libya. Still, the paradox remains. To maintain its influence abroad, the United States must renew itself at home.
There’s no doubt about the devaluation of U.S. power — just look at events in the Middle East. The sharp crack as Israel’s prime minister slapped President Obama’s face with a refusal to halt settlements still reverberates around the region. After decades of American engagement in the peace process, there is no peace at all.
America’s currency is at rock bottom in the Arab world, not because it can’t press buttons — or find and kill Osama bin Laden — but because its policies make no sense.
It makes no sense to provide Israel with weapons to destroy Palestinian property and then offer assistance to put the rubble back together again. It makes no sense to trumpet freedom and justice — belatedly — in Egypt and remain virtually silent about the gross human rights violations reported in Bahrain. It makes no sense to tell Muammar el-Qaddafi to leave Libya because of crimes against his own people — and then to help him evade international justice by touting for his safe haven in a country that doesn’t acknowledge the International Criminal Court. What more powerful signal can there be to despots present and future, that you can murder and torture all you want — but if you go quietly when you’ve had enough, America will buy you a ticket. Far from stopping conflicts, this will ensure a steady supply for years to come.
So the decline of U.S. power may be good for the Middle East. Not because the vacuum will be filled by more palatable players — but because this one needs a break. It needs, to paraphrase President Clinton, to find new friends, instead of just searching out its enemies. It needs to show the world that it will no longer back leaders who abuse their own people’s freedom in the mistaken belief that it will help Americans sleep more securely back home.
With Washington’s power diminished, new Arab governments will have to stand on their own feet, stumble, fall and hopefully emerge stronger. Israel will have to make new accom- modations with them. Don’t assume the worst. Freedom is a much more inspiring teacher than oppression. There really is a new world. Only this time it’s not called America.
America’s currency is at rock bottom in the Arab world, not because it can’t press buttons — or find and kill Osama bin Laden — but because its policies make no sense.
It makes no sense to provide Israel with weapons to destroy Palestinian property and then offer assistance to put the rubble back together again. It makes no sense to trumpet freedom and justice — belatedly — in Egypt and remain virtually silent about the gross human rights violations reported in Bahrain. It makes no sense to tell Muammar el-Qaddafi to leave Libya because of crimes against his own people — and then to help him evade international justice by touting for his safe haven in a country that doesn’t acknowledge the International Criminal Court. What more powerful signal can there be to despots present and future, that you can murder and torture all you want — but if you go quietly when you’ve had enough, America will buy you a ticket. Far from stopping conflicts, this will ensure a steady supply for years to come.
So the decline of U.S. power may be good for the Middle East. Not because the vacuum will be filled by more palatable players — but because this one needs a break. It needs, to paraphrase President Clinton, to find new friends, instead of just searching out its enemies. It needs to show the world that it will no longer back leaders who abuse their own people’s freedom in the mistaken belief that it will help Americans sleep more securely back home.
With Washington’s power diminished, new Arab governments will have to stand on their own feet, stumble, fall and hopefully emerge stronger. Israel will have to make new accom- modations with them. Don’t assume the worst. Freedom is a much more inspiring teacher than oppression. There really is a new world. Only this time it’s not called America.
Michael Ma
Is America really in decline?
Perhaps no one can say. You can come up with 10,000 examples of how U.S. influence is waning, but you can also come up with another 10,000 examples of how America’s influence is increasing. The increase or decrease is almost like the difference between 9.6 or 9.7 seconds in a race. I think that even in comparative decline, the United States is still the most influential country in the world. This in large part is because on a global scale America is still able to show the way. Intentionally or not, it serves as a role model. Developing countries have the advantage of being able to learn from its mistakes, make rapid adjustments, and implement policies of sustainable growth. But like the concept of ‘‘infinity’’ in mathematics, even with those in the rear drawing closer to No. 1, it’s impossible to catch up.
The true advantage for America isn’t military or economic strength, but culture. Its culture is authoritative in that it was the first world culture and continues to be the leading one. It may be a cliché to talk about the far-flung impact of Coca-Cola and Hollywood, but these products continue to wield profound influence. Other nations might reject aspects of American life, but the fact that they must continue to respond makes them peripheral to American culture. This is unlikely to change soon, and illustrates why talk of U.S. decline is perhaps exaggerated.
Perhaps no one can say. You can come up with 10,000 examples of how U.S. influence is waning, but you can also come up with another 10,000 examples of how America’s influence is increasing. The increase or decrease is almost like the difference between 9.6 or 9.7 seconds in a race. I think that even in comparative decline, the United States is still the most influential country in the world. This in large part is because on a global scale America is still able to show the way. Intentionally or not, it serves as a role model. Developing countries have the advantage of being able to learn from its mistakes, make rapid adjustments, and implement policies of sustainable growth. But like the concept of ‘‘infinity’’ in mathematics, even with those in the rear drawing closer to No. 1, it’s impossible to catch up.
The true advantage for America isn’t military or economic strength, but culture. Its culture is authoritative in that it was the first world culture and continues to be the leading one. It may be a cliché to talk about the far-flung impact of Coca-Cola and Hollywood, but these products continue to wield profound influence. Other nations might reject aspects of American life, but the fact that they must continue to respond makes them peripheral to American culture. This is unlikely to change soon, and illustrates why talk of U.S. decline is perhaps exaggerated.
Ivara Esege
American political and economic influence may be waning but what is certainly not waning is America’s cultural influence. Cultural — or soft — power is the most significant form of influence. In Nigeria, where I am from, cable television has become much cheaper. Young people have always watched American films — in my childhood, to watch a film automatically meant to watch an American film — but now, they also watch MTV and E! and other American entertainment channels. They know the latest news about Beyoncé and Angelina Jolie. They are familiar with American cultural cues, with Americanspeak. They even know quite a bit about, and are interested in, American politics.
Nigeria is only an example of what is no doubt happening in many other parts of the world. Not only is American cultural production still so influential, but cultural production in many parts of the world still has its eyes trained across the ocean, at America. Actors in many parts of the world still aspire to Hollywood. Writers aspire to New York publishing. Thespians to Broadway.
Increasingly, in countries that have a large emerging middle class, to ascend to a new class is sometimes synonymous with increased consumption of American culture, and perhaps even American food. This phenomenon clearly brings with it certain small losses; it would be ideal if the world’s cultural influence were not so heavily focused on one country. If a non-American wins an Oscar, that non-American’s country erupts in national applause. The reverse is never the same. But is it, on the whole, a good or bad thing? It is what it is.
Nigeria is only an example of what is no doubt happening in many other parts of the world. Not only is American cultural production still so influential, but cultural production in many parts of the world still has its eyes trained across the ocean, at America. Actors in many parts of the world still aspire to Hollywood. Writers aspire to New York publishing. Thespians to Broadway.
Increasingly, in countries that have a large emerging middle class, to ascend to a new class is sometimes synonymous with increased consumption of American culture, and perhaps even American food. This phenomenon clearly brings with it certain small losses; it would be ideal if the world’s cultural influence were not so heavily focused on one country. If a non-American wins an Oscar, that non-American’s country erupts in national applause. The reverse is never the same. But is it, on the whole, a good or bad thing? It is what it is.
Noma
Osama bin Laden is dead. World- wide applause maps out the degree of American influence. But globalization hits harder and faster. We are more aware of the impossibility of regulating or even theorizing about world affairs in the way of old-fashioned diplomats and pundits. Remember the heated debate about a possible ‘‘Obama doctrine’’ defining U.S. foreign policy. Sheer nostalgia!
There can be no such doctrine today, beyond periodically reassessing U.S. interests abroad. The cur- rent president excels at this, muting down his eloquence when pragmatism prevails. The Arab Spring? A surprise. Bashar al-Assad’s massacres in Syria? Cautious indignation. Beijing’s iron fist? Let’s be polite. America is no triumphant superpower. The question is: Was it ever one or was it just in the eye of the beholder?
For a generation, Washington has been considered the only ‘‘hyper-power.’’ Yet no major international issue has been solved: There’s been no Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement; no solution to the India-Pakistan conflict; no termination of the North Korean nightmare; no elimination of Iran’s bullies. Factions are still tearing up Iraq after a bloody conflict that has stirred up anti-Americanism the world over. There is no end in sight to the war in Afghanistan. There is, however, an overwhelm- ing truth: In our time, nothing has ever been achieved without America. Russia keeps chasing its ghosts. China plays close to the vest. Among the so-called BRICS, only Brazil is asserting some international ambition. Europe is as weak as ever on the world scene.
America may not rule the world but it remains the only major player. Good or bad? What matters is that America has come to realize it cannot act alone. The superpower might turn to smart power.
There can be no such doctrine today, beyond periodically reassessing U.S. interests abroad. The cur- rent president excels at this, muting down his eloquence when pragmatism prevails. The Arab Spring? A surprise. Bashar al-Assad’s massacres in Syria? Cautious indignation. Beijing’s iron fist? Let’s be polite. America is no triumphant superpower. The question is: Was it ever one or was it just in the eye of the beholder?
For a generation, Washington has been considered the only ‘‘hyper-power.’’ Yet no major international issue has been solved: There’s been no Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement; no solution to the India-Pakistan conflict; no termination of the North Korean nightmare; no elimination of Iran’s bullies. Factions are still tearing up Iraq after a bloody conflict that has stirred up anti-Americanism the world over. There is no end in sight to the war in Afghanistan. There is, however, an overwhelm- ing truth: In our time, nothing has ever been achieved without America. Russia keeps chasing its ghosts. China plays close to the vest. Among the so-called BRICS, only Brazil is asserting some international ambition. Europe is as weak as ever on the world scene.
America may not rule the world but it remains the only major player. Good or bad? What matters is that America has come to realize it cannot act alone. The superpower might turn to smart power.
Cornell University
The United States has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past 70 years. Since 1942 the U.S. has played the essential role of ‘‘globocop,’’ replacing Britain as the world’s foremost champion of liberalism — the nation that acts, when others do not, to stop great evils (whether they be slavery or ethnic cleansing); that promotes liberal values; and pre- vents illiberal states from becoming hegemons.
Without American power, it would have been impossible (or at least much more costly) to stop German militarism twice — not to mention the aggression of Imperial Japan, Fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, North Korea, ultranationalist Serbia and Baathist Iraq, among others. It also would have been impossible to imagine free markets and free elections spreading so much farther than expected in 1945 — or nuclear arms proliferating so much less.
If American influence is on the wane, then that is very bad news, not only for the United States but for the rest of what was once called the Free World. Most especially it would be bad news for the European Union. Europeans would not be able to concentrate so much of their resources in economic and cultural pursuits were it not for the protection provided by the U.S. armed forces. (The E.U. spends less than 2 percent of G.D.P. on defense, compared to nearly 5 percent for the U.S.)
I’m not convinced that the waning of U.S. power is inevitable by any stretch. But what prevents America from acting as assertively as it has in the past? Our fiscal difficulties need to be addressed, but they do not require slashing defense spending or foreign aid, which consume less than 20 percent of the federal budget. Restoring fiscal sanity means coming to grips with entitlement spending — something that can be done, as Paul Ryan’s Republican budget shows, without stinting on defense.
Assuming that Washington makes some prudent budget cuts, there is no reason that the 21st century cannot be another American century. The U.S. actually compares favorably to China, Brazil, India and other rising powers by most measures. We have a youthful and growing population; a vibrant economy that is at the forefront of the information age; and a powerful military with power-projection capabilities that its rivals can only dream about.
America’s greatest asset is that it stands for a philosophy of self-determination that is welcomed by most of the world’s population — even among those who otherwise resent America’s seeming omnipotence. Unless you are Kim Jong Il, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Muammar el-Qaddafi, or a similar malefactor, American power does not threaten you — in fact it protects you against these rogue actors and others. Thus there is scant chance of other powerful nations combining to check American power. There is every prospect that in the future, as in the immediate past, other states will look to America for protection — as China’s neighbors increasingly do. America has the resources to answer the call, assuming it keeps the will to do so.
Without American power, it would have been impossible (or at least much more costly) to stop German militarism twice — not to mention the aggression of Imperial Japan, Fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, North Korea, ultranationalist Serbia and Baathist Iraq, among others. It also would have been impossible to imagine free markets and free elections spreading so much farther than expected in 1945 — or nuclear arms proliferating so much less.
If American influence is on the wane, then that is very bad news, not only for the United States but for the rest of what was once called the Free World. Most especially it would be bad news for the European Union. Europeans would not be able to concentrate so much of their resources in economic and cultural pursuits were it not for the protection provided by the U.S. armed forces. (The E.U. spends less than 2 percent of G.D.P. on defense, compared to nearly 5 percent for the U.S.)
I’m not convinced that the waning of U.S. power is inevitable by any stretch. But what prevents America from acting as assertively as it has in the past? Our fiscal difficulties need to be addressed, but they do not require slashing defense spending or foreign aid, which consume less than 20 percent of the federal budget. Restoring fiscal sanity means coming to grips with entitlement spending — something that can be done, as Paul Ryan’s Republican budget shows, without stinting on defense.
Assuming that Washington makes some prudent budget cuts, there is no reason that the 21st century cannot be another American century. The U.S. actually compares favorably to China, Brazil, India and other rising powers by most measures. We have a youthful and growing population; a vibrant economy that is at the forefront of the information age; and a powerful military with power-projection capabilities that its rivals can only dream about.
America’s greatest asset is that it stands for a philosophy of self-determination that is welcomed by most of the world’s population — even among those who otherwise resent America’s seeming omnipotence. Unless you are Kim Jong Il, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Muammar el-Qaddafi, or a similar malefactor, American power does not threaten you — in fact it protects you against these rogue actors and others. Thus there is scant chance of other powerful nations combining to check American power. There is every prospect that in the future, as in the immediate past, other states will look to America for protection — as China’s neighbors increasingly do. America has the resources to answer the call, assuming it keeps the will to do so.
Mikhail Galustov for the New York Times
The gradual diminishing of American influence, and the rise of other power centers, primarily China, is a natural and logical process. Unnatural was the short period of unconditional world leadership that the U.S. enjoyed at the historic moment of the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet state.
The post-Soviet decade marked the peak of American influence and authority. Only the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Cold War brought ‘‘the only superpower’’ the authority unthinkable before: Some philosophers even started speaking about ‘‘the end of history,’’ in the sense that there were no more alternatives to American leadership and values. But his- tory took a different turn. The ‘‘conflict balance’’ of the Cold War was very soon changed by global destabilization. The term of the third post-Soviet president, George W. Bush, started with the 9/11 catastrophe and war in Afghanistan. International terrorism was vividly painted as a conflict of civilizations.
The war in Iraq — started despite the protests of the allies and with no sanction of the U.N. Security Council — was, perhaps, a turning point: The world saw that America was taking on too much. The Bush presidency was marked by America’s diminishing reputation, and Barack Obama, during his election campaign, promised to restore America’s popularity, withdraw from military conflicts and focus on domestic problems and the financial crisis.
Now we speak not only about America’s weakened role, but about the enhancement of such power centers as China, India, Brazil, the European Union, and post-crisis Russia.
We are living in an interesting time. The world is rapidly changing. I would like it to come as soon as possible to a new balance, where there would be several centers capable of sharing responsibility for security and development both in certain regions — for example in an expanded Europe, including Russia — and in the entire world.
The post-Soviet decade marked the peak of American influence and authority. Only the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Cold War brought ‘‘the only superpower’’ the authority unthinkable before: Some philosophers even started speaking about ‘‘the end of history,’’ in the sense that there were no more alternatives to American leadership and values. But his- tory took a different turn. The ‘‘conflict balance’’ of the Cold War was very soon changed by global destabilization. The term of the third post-Soviet president, George W. Bush, started with the 9/11 catastrophe and war in Afghanistan. International terrorism was vividly painted as a conflict of civilizations.
The war in Iraq — started despite the protests of the allies and with no sanction of the U.N. Security Council — was, perhaps, a turning point: The world saw that America was taking on too much. The Bush presidency was marked by America’s diminishing reputation, and Barack Obama, during his election campaign, promised to restore America’s popularity, withdraw from military conflicts and focus on domestic problems and the financial crisis.
Now we speak not only about America’s weakened role, but about the enhancement of such power centers as China, India, Brazil, the European Union, and post-crisis Russia.
We are living in an interesting time. The world is rapidly changing. I would like it to come as soon as possible to a new balance, where there would be several centers capable of sharing responsibility for security and development both in certain regions — for example in an expanded Europe, including Russia — and in the entire world.
Stratfor
October 9, 2012 , The
Emerging Doctrine of the United States
Từ trước tới nay
ưu tiên chính của Washington là đảm bảo rằng không mối
đe dọa nào trong số những mối đe dọa thách thức lợi
ích cơ bản của Mỹ ..
Do đó, quyền
lợi của Hoa Kỳ trong những gì đang xảy ra ở Tây Thái
Bình Dương là điều dễ hiểu. Nhưng ngay cả
ở đó, Hoa Kỳ là, ít nhất là cho bây giờ, cho phép lực
lượng khu vực để tham gia vào nhau trong một cuộc đấu
tranh mà chưa ảnh hưởng đến sự cân bằng sức mạnh
của khu vực. Các đồng minh của Mỹ và các bên liên
quan, bao gồm Philippines, Việt Nam và Nhật Bản, đã được
chơi cờ trong vùng biển của khu vực mà không có một áp
dụng trực tiếp của sức mạnh hải quân Mỹ - mặc dù
việc Mỹ can thiệp là có thể xảy ra. Theo học thuyết
mới nổi, sự không can thiệp của Mỹ có nghĩa là số
phận của một đất nước như Syria là trong tay của
người dân Syria hay các nước lân cận. Hoa Kỳ lkhông
sẵn sàng chịu phí tổn và lời vu khống cố gắng giải
quyết vấn đề ở đây. Không phải tất cả mọi
thứ xảy ra trên thế giới đòi hỏi tới sự can thiệp
của Mỹ..
Nếu duy trì, học
thuyết này sẽ buộc thế giới phải xem xét lại nhiều
điều. Nhiều người lên án Mỹ quyền bá chủ dường
như cũng đòi hỏi điều đó. Có một sự thay đổi
theo cách mà họ chưa nhận thấy ngoại trừ sự vắng mặt
mà họ coi là một thất bại của Mỹ.
Trong bối cảnh cuộc
bầu cử tổng thống Mỹ đang diễn ra, học thuyết này,
đã lặng lẽ xuất hiện dưới thời Obama, xuất hiện
mâu thuẫn với quan điểm của Mitt Romney, một
điểm tôi thực hiện trong một bài báo trước . Lập
luận cốt lõi của tôi về chính sách đối ngoại là
thực tế này, không phải là Tổng thống hay là chính
sách trên giấy gọi là chính sách đối ngoại. Hoa Kỳ
đã bước vào thời kỳ mà nó phải điều chỉnh từ
thống trị quân sự sang hành động tinh tế hơn, và quan
trọng hơn, cho phép các sự kiện diễn ra một cách tự
nhiên . Đây là một sự trưởng thành của chính sách
đối ngoại của Mỹ, chứ không phải một sự suy
thoái. Quan trọng nhất, nó đang diễn ra không phải
từ quan điểm của cá nhân nào, nó sẽ tiếp tục định
hình bất kể ai thắng trong cuộc bầu cử tổng thống
Mỹ. Mỹ đang thay đổi mô hình mà nó hoạt động. Nói
quá lên, nó thiết kế lại hệ điều hành của mình để
tập trung vào các yếu tố cần thiết và chấp nhận rằng
có rất nhiều việc trên thế giới, không quan trọng với
Hoa Kỳ, sẽ tự giải quyết.
Điều này không có
nghĩa rằng Hoa Kỳ sẽ tự tách ra khỏi các vấn đề thế
giới. Mỹ kiểm soát các đại dương của thế giới
và sản xuất gần một phần tư sản phẩm quốc nội của
thế giới. Trong khi tách rời là không thể, tham gia
kiểm soát, dựa trên một sự hiểu biết thực tế về
lợi ích quốc gia, là có thể.
Điều này sẽ làm
hệ thống quốc tế khó chịu, đặc biệt là đồng minh
của Mỹ. Nó cũng sẽ tạo căng thẳng tại Mỹ, cả
từ phe cánh tả muốn một chính sách đối ngoại nhân
quyền, và cánh hữu, xác định lợi ích quốc gia một
cách rộng rãi. Tuy nhiên, những khó khăn của thập
kỷ qua đã đặt một gánh nặng cho Mỹ và do đó sẽ
thay đổi cách thức thế giới hoạt động.
Điểm quan trọng là
không ai quyết định học thuyết mới này. Nó đang
nổi lên từ thực tế Hoa Kỳ phải đối mặt. Đó
là cách học thuyết nổi lên mạnh mẽ . Họ tự biểu
hiện đầu tiên và được công bố khi mọi người nhận
ra cách thức làm việc.
Read more: The Emerging Doctrine of the United States | Stratfor
Read more: The Emerging Doctrine of the United States | Stratfor
"The
Emerging Doctrine of the United States is
republished with permission of Stratfor."
