NHÂN QUYỀN VÀ TỰ DO: Tương lai Trung Quốc

-Tương lai Trung Quốc: China's Uncertain Path (National Interest 12-10-12) Jonathan Levine [2]

With the announcement that November 8 will mark the official Chinese leadership transition, the country brings to a close what has at times been a painful process. The decennial communist ritual has been marred this year by a series [3] of [4] embarrassing[5] scandals [6], including Bo Xilai’s fall from grace and the dismissal of a corrupt railways chief.

While China’s current lame-duck cadres do their best to mop things up before the big day, their woes of the last few months are only dress rehearsals for the far more consequential difficulties that will face the incoming leadership of president-“elect” Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. Over the next decade, China will have to grapple with a number of structural dilemmas, and the potential solutions go well beyond the current reforms. Whether the new leadership is up to the task remains an open question, but no one can deny that Mr. Xi will enter office next year with a very full plate.

Islands of Instability

In 1831, the underwater volcano Empedocles erupted off the coast of Sicily and resulted in the emergence of new island, Ferdinandea. But before the lava had even cooled, England, France, Spain and the Kingdom of Sicily had laid claim to the simmering rock, stoking waves of popular nationalism in the press. Conflict was only averted when erosion caused the fiery island to sink back into the sea. It is doubtful that China and its Asian neighbors will be so lucky in their island disputes.

As I have written [7] before, China’s international actions over various disputed islands have caused a balancing coalition to form, which seems likely to become a long-term geopolitical headache for leaders in Beijing. But the islands’ effect on China’s domestic landscape may prove a much more profound predicament.

As popular protests convulsed the capital and major cities last month, the world saw firsthand one of China’s great demons: nationalism. The force of popular anger has toppled more than one government in China’s past. Today, rather than being an organic outgrowth, it has been harnessed by the Communist Party as a tool of statecraft, a straw man on an international scale. If the people’s rage can be kept simmering at Japan, the United States or Taiwan, it is less likely to be directed at the Communist Party—and its excesses.

However, nationalism is at best a double-edged sword and at worst puts the party in a straightjacket. China-Japan trade is an extensive $345 billion enterprise[8] and recently the two nations marked (quietly) the fortieth anniversary of normalized relations [9]. In short, heeding the angry calls of nationalists for economicboycott [10] and worse [11] would be catastrophic for China, especially as mounting evidence of economic slowdown has begun to emerge.

By creating nationalism and then ignoring it, leaders in Beijing open themselves up to charges of weakness. Mao and Deng, secure in their own command, could brush it off, but Beijing’s new technocrats are far less secure within China’s immature civil-military institutions. They are more vulnerable to the anger of the mob if they seek compromise. The end result is a Faustian choice where the only thing worse than ignoring the mob would be obeisance to it. Xi Jinping will have to navigate through this dilemma if he hopes to name his successor in 2022.

The End of the Miracle

Doomsayers have been predicting the end of China almost since the beginning of China as we know it in the late 1970s. They have been wrong for over thirty years, and those still predicting the elusive “hard landing” and subsequent collapse probably are still mistaken. However, that does not mean China’s growth will not slow down, perhaps considerably in the coming years. The last thirty years in China have been described as an economic miracle, and anyone on the ground can attest that this is no exaggeration. Yet it is very likely that we are at the end of the miracle, and that future Chinese growth, like that in all developing countries, will slow to lower and more sustainable levels.

The most salient factor in this slowing growth is China’s size. Unlike other nations that have experienced breakneck growth and then slowed—like Japan or Germany—China’s uniquely large population presents obvious difficulties. Germany’s population of around eighty million is roughly equivalent to the population of Sichuan Province, China’s fourth largest. All normal indicators must be adjusted for China’s vastness. As a result, even if China’s growth slows to 6 percent a year—still an enviable figure in any absolute sense—it would have the effect of creating a functional recession [12] for a population long engorged on 10 percent growth and a skyrocketing standard of living.

The Chinese challenge is best summed up in a telling anecdote from Decision Points, the memoir of President George W. Bush, who recounted asking Chinese president Hu Jintao “what keeps him awake at night.” The Communist Party chairman did not need to think very hard. “Creating 25 million jobs a year,” he replied.

If Chinese economic growth cannot produce those jobs for the next generation, it will undermine the central argument for the Communist Party’s continued existence. The shotgun social contract—economic growth in exchange for one-party rule—could become untenable. Slowing global demand [13], slowing directinvestment [14], a deflating housing bubble [15], immature financial instruments [16] and bloated public spending [17] are only the most apparent drags that the new Chinese leadership will have to ameliorate or accommodate going forward.

The Devil in Demography

U.S. policy makers look to the soon-to-be-retiring baby-boomer generation with nothing short of terror. Now on the cusp of an entitlement windfall, they are well on track to overwhelm the entire federal budget unless those programs are reformed. Yet as bleak as our situation is, the Chinese soon will confront the same problem on a scale of biblical proportions.

China’s one-child policy by some estimates [18] may have prevented up to four hundred million births, but it has also brought the long-term fertility rate to historic lows. Today it is roughly 1.56, well below the rate of replacement of about 2.1, the size required to keep the population relatively constant. This has generated a vicious phenomenon known as 4:2:1—one child, two parents, four grandparents. Even with thirty years of supersonic growth, China is not wealthy enough to offset the effect of the avalanche of pensions and insurance claims that are on the horizon. As The Economist succinctly put it [19], China will become old before it becomes rich. For the youth, who are culturally enjoined to tend to their elders, it will be an enormous and lasting burden.

Much was made recently when China surpassed [20] Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy as measured by overall GDP. Given China’s size, this milestone was inevitable, just as it is equally inevitable that China will one day surpass the United States by this metric. Lost in the weeds, however, was the real number that matters, GDP per capita. Here China is losing big. According to the CIA World Factbook, the United States and Japan, both of whom face rapidly aging societies, have GDPs per capita of $49,000 and $35,200. China, by contrast, languishes at $8,500. This translates to an individual living standard comparable to Bosnia or East Timor. In other words, Japan, despite its perennial hangover from the lost decade and its being on track to become [21]the oldest society the world has ever known, will be more than capable of managing its aged, as will the United States. For China, this is far from certain.

Since Deng Xiaoping’s opening up and reform, the Chinese government and people have been consumed with two missions, undoing the damage wrought by Mao Zedong and making money. But as new generations emerge that have no firsthand recollection of Mao’s deprivations, this will not be enough. As Abraham Maslow famously posited in his “Hierarchy of Needs,” after food, water, shelter and basic physiological necessities are met, humans will demand more. Things such as safety, clean water and property rights begin to come to the fore. On top of mitigating all of the above challenges, Xi Jinping and his cadres will have to raise quality of life for their people as well, and in ways that are increasingly complicated and intangible.

China’s Communists face another long march—and this time it may be one they do not finish.

Jonathan Levine is a lecturer of American Studies and English at Tsinghua University in Beijing and a contributing analyst at Wikistrat, a geostrategic consulting group. You can follow him on Twitter at @LevineJonathan.

Source URL (retrieved on Oct 12, 2012): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinas-uncertain-path-7583

-Poison-Proofing China

Project Syndicate -Health and environmental threats are common in China, because perverse incentives encourage dangerous practices, including adulteration of food and drugs. To foster widespread compliance with quality and safety standards, Chinese authorities must craft appropriate inducements, rather than relying on top-down policies.

- Canada không muốn Huawei đầu tư (BBC). – Những rắc rối của Huawei ở Ấn Độ(NLĐ).

-Trung Quốc: Thặng dư thương mại tháng 9 tăng vượt dự báo -Xuất nhập khẩu của Trung Quốc đều tăng là dấu hiệu cho thấy nhu cầu tiêu thụ toàn cầu có xu hướng phục hồi.

Commodity Prices Rebound on Supply Shortfalls
IMF
Commodity prices, led by food and energy, leapt 10 percent in the third quarter due to supply constraints, according to the latest IMF research.
Chinese Legal Reform: Game On?
theDiplomat.com

Tiền tiếp tục đổ vào quỹ thị trường mới nổi sau QE3
Quỹ trái phiếu và chứng khoán thị trường mới nổi tiếp tục nhận được luồng vốn đầu tư lớn nhờ đợt nới lỏng định lượng lần 3 (QE3).

--- Châu Âu vẫn còn bất đồng về thời gian cắt giảm công nợ (VOA).
- Brics: Những người hùng đang yếu dần (VEF).
- Nguy cơ từ khối nợ công trong ngân hàng Nhật (ĐTCK).

Hard to be Easing
Project Syndicate The US Federal Reserve’s third round of quantitative easing, or QE3, has many observers arguing that the effects on risky assets could be greater than in previous rounds. But, despite the Fed’s commitment to aggressive monetary easing, QE3's effects on the real economy and on US equities could well be smaller and more fleeting.
Robustness of IMF data scrutinised
(Financial Times)- An FT exercise to evaluate latest fund research on tax rises and public spending cuts raises queries about sampling and time period used
On The Non-burden of Debt
PAUL KRUGMAN
An alphabetical metaphor.

--Smuggish Thoughts (Self-indulgent)

PAUL KRUGMAN
Not Sammy Glick but Cassandra.

-Politics Meets Poverty in Southeast Asia

theDiplomat.com
Populist economics is on the rise in Southeast Asia. Politicians have been actively adopting policies that aim to impress upon the poor that governments are doing something, however trivial, to improve their conditions. It is generally a positive development but is it sustainable?
Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted as Prime Minister in 2006 but has remained popular among the rural poor. In fact, his younger sister is the country’s incumbent head of state. What is the reason for his enduring appeal? Maybe the great majority, especially the poor, have not forgotten his various ‘gifts’ to ordinary Thais.
Under his watch, Thaksin provided a life insurance scheme for the poor, bicycle loans for students, scholarships for indigent students, loans for low-priced TV sets and computers, loans for the purchase of taxi cabs, and cheap housing for middle income urban families. Thaksin also built fitness and day care centers in rural villages, gave educational gift packages for every newborn baby, and lowered the school fees in the country.
The targeted delivery of high-impact services to the very poor segments of the population was a component in Thaksin’s economic program which came to be known as Thaksinomics. This proved to be highly successful, at least politically, in boosting the image of Thaksin as hero of the masses.
As expected, Thaksin’s critics accused him of resorting to populism to win the political support of the poor. But Thaksin was perhaps vindicated when his political enemies adopted his approach of giving special gifts to the poor. The administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva not only provided free bus and train rides and free water allowances to poor citizens, it also unveiled what it called nine “New Year gifts” to the people which involved, among other things, loan access for informal workers, registration of motorcycle-taxi drivers, recognition of street hawkers, maintaining the price of cooking gas and free use of electricity.
Yingluck defeated Abhisit’s party in last year’s elections and following her victory she immediately signaled her intent to continue the legacy of her elder brother when it comes to social welfare programs. Aside from reviving some of Thaksin’s programs like the rice mortgage policy, Yingluck has some new gifts to offer to her constituents. Some of the more to controversial among these include the commitment to raise the minimum wage and the entry salary for university-educated civil servants. Yingluck also vowed to distribute free tablet computers to first graders. She also set-up a women's development fund to promote the well-being of the women sector.
Similarly, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak has expanded the assistance schemes, cash handouts, housing and healthcare initiatives that are conceptualized to help the needy and jobless. The Bantuan Rakyat 1 Malaysia 2.0 program, which will begin dispensing aid in early 2013, is expected to cover 4.3 million households and 2.7 million single individuals aged 21 and older. 4.78 million households are said to have benefited from the program, BR1M, which didn’t cover single individuals.
Under the program, households with outcomes under RM 3,000 receive an allocation of RM500 (U.S. $167.48), while single individuals aged 21 or older who have a monthly income of RM 2,000 or less also receive aid.
Health care is another aspect of the program. It was already announced that 70 new clinics will be set-up next year. The facilities are expected to provide blood test services including cholesterol, glucose and urine tests. The government also plans to upgrade 350 clinics nationwide and distribute 150 dialysis machines in public hemodialysis centers nationwide.
In the states of Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan, the government also is seeking to uplift the poor by building 80,000 new houses with selling prices between RM100,000 and RM400,000 per unit.
Under the 1Malaysia Welfare Program, funds will be allocated to assist senior citizens, children, disabled workers, and the chronically ill. The government is also providing funding to train the children of Indian estate workers who do poorly on their exams.
Similar to Malaysia and Thailand, the Philippines has its own version of providing specific services to the poor. Known as Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program or the Conditional Cash Transfer, it aims to help 4.3 million poor households by 2016. The program enrolls beneficiaries who are required to attend seminars before receiving cash gifts from the government. Parents are also required to send their children to schools and to report to the nearest health center for vaccines and medical check-ups. The program has been praised by the World Bank and, as of July 1st of this year, it had provided support to “3,041,152 household beneficiaries in 1,400 cities and municipalities in 79 provinces in all 17 regions nationwide” according to a government statement.
It’s quite possible that the Southeast Asian governments decided to adopt these populist measures to enhance their electoral and political success. But this does not work all the time. For example, Thaksin was still booted out of power by a military coup despite his popularity, while his successor, Abhisit, lost badly in the polls despite his administration’s New Year’s gifts to the poor.
Regardless of their real impact on electoral politics, there’s no denying that the so-called populist measures in the region have tended to strengthen national leaders’ ties with the poor.
After witnessing the poor conditions in Kampung Bantal, Najib offered his 1Malaysia Welfare Program as a key intervention to uplift the lives of the people there. “Folks here survive on basic necessities and their low income makes life even harder for them to cope. As a responsible Prime Minister, I must never allow people like the folks in Kampung Bantal to be left out from the country’s development,” Najib has said.
“Hardworking Malaysians should not be punished by the escalating cost of living. Therefore my government, while working hard to ensure persistent economic growth, will not compromise the interest of the poor and the working class,” he added.
Similarly, facing criticism for the supposed ineffectiveness of his cash transfer program, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III challenged the opposition to take their case directly to the poor. During his annual state of the nation address last July, Aquino said: “If you take issue with the fact that 5.2 million of the country’s poorest households can now avail of quality healthcare services without worrying about the cost, then look them straight in the eye and tell them, ‘I do not want you to get better.’ If it angers you that three million Filipino families have been empowered to fulfill their dreams because of Pantawid Pamilya, then look them straight in the eye and tell them, ‘I will take away the hope you now have for your future.’”
Populist measures often do benefit the party in power which is why scholars commonly discuss the possible politicization of poverty alleviation programs. In Malaysia, for example, some NGOs are questioning why politicians, instead of welfare agencies, are distributing the cash vouchers to beneficiaries.
Another concern is the sustainability of these programs which require a large amount of financing. This is being made clear in Thailand where Yingluck is facing a lot of difficulties in fulfilling all her campaign promises, in particular the commitment to raise the minimum wage.
Other academics are also arguing that that cash transfers and other dole outs are unimaginative and “band-aid solutions” to the chronic and systemic problem of intergenerational poverty. They want public funds to be used instead to build schools, health centers, and mass housing. Activists in the Philippines in particular have decried the expansion of cash handouts at the expense of other social service expenditures.
The rise of populist policies in Southeast Asia aimed at uplifting the disenfranchised is depressing proof that the impressive economic growth in the region has not been inclusive. Behind the glowing statistics revealed by robust stock market indexes, export numbers, and rising GDP rates is a story of a region suffering from extreme economic inequality. It is no accident that Thailand, which suffered badly in the 1997 financial crisis, was among the first to experiment with policies that seek to bridge the gap between the poorest of the poor and the rest of society.
Populist economics has its clear benefits but remains an inferior alternative to the more comprehensive approach of finding long-term economic solutions to the age-old problems of poverty, inequality, and deprivation.
The post Politics Meets Poverty in Southeast Asia appeared first on The Diplomat.
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