NHÂN QUYỀN VÀ TỰ DO: Wikileaks: Dũng ‘chắc chắn’ có thêm một nhiệm kỳ

Hai ông Nguyễn Tấn Dũng và Trương Tấn Sang trong lễ khai mạc Đại hội XI

--Wikileaks: Dũng ‘chắc chắn’ có thêm một nhiệm kỳ
DCVOnline - Wikileaks
Thực tế từ đại hội đảng đang diễn ra ở Hà Nội hiện nay cho thấy những tiên đoán của TĐS Hoa Kỳ - 14 tháng trước ngày đại hội đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam xảy ra - là tương đối chính xác.
Nếu như ông Nguyễn Tấn Dũng được thêm một nhiệm kỳ cùng lúc với ông Trương Tấn Sang nắm chức Tổng Bí thư đảng sau kỳ đại hội lần thứ 11 này thì qủa thật, đây là lần đầu tiên hai người miền Nam nắm giữ hai chức vụ quyền uy và then chốt nhất nước cùng lúc, và cùng với lứa tuổi 60, họ có khả năng giữ hai nhiệm kỳ liên tiếp, tổng cộng mười năm - một tình trạng, theo truyền thống, không thể để cho xẩy ra được là chức Tổng Bí thư Đảng xưa nay do người miền Bắc nắm; kể từ khi một Lê Duẩn sắt máu chết từ năm 1986, chức Tổng Bí thư này luôn nằm trong tay người miền Bắc, Thủ tướng gốc người miền Nam, và người thứ ba trong hệ thống quyền lực Việt Nam, Chủ tịch nước là người miền Trung. Theo một nguồn tin của Toà Đại sứ Hoa Kỳ (TĐS HK) ở Việt Nam, thì chủ nghĩa địa phương này ngày càng lúc càng mất ý nghĩa và không mang tính quan trọng nhiều như trước đây. Bản công điện mật của TĐS HK bị Wikileaks tiết lộ còn cho hay:

Vén váy
Nguồn: OntheNet

Theo nguồn tin của TĐS, có những sự chia rẽ, bè phái quan trọng giữa ba người miền Nam là ba ông Trương Tấn Sang, Nguyễn Tấn Dũng và Nguyễn Minh Triết, cả ba ông đều từng là cựu bí thư thành ủy thành phố Hồ Chí Minh. Sự thật chưa hẳn thế; tuy nhiên, sự đánh giá của chúng tôi ở đây là nếu cả hai ông Thủ tướng và Chủ tịch nước là người gốc miền Nam là một liều thuốc đắng mà người gốc Bắc không nuốt được trong kỳ đại hội đảng lần thứ 10 năm 2006, nhưng cuối cùng cùng tạm chấp nhận được vì chức Tổng Bí thư lọt vào tay một người gốc Bắc. Mất cả hai chức vụ Tổng Bí thư đảng và Thủ tướng (vào tay người miền Nam) là quá sức dự tính của một số người. (Ghi chú: Cũng quan trọng để nhớ rằng chủ nghĩa phe phái, mà tính địa phương là điểm mạnh nhất, không đi từ ý thức hệ -- mà vì quyền lực, sự bao che đỡ đầu và giàu có. Hết ghi chú.)

Bản điện tin mật cũng ghi nhận là hai ông Dũng và Sang sẽ không ai chịu nhường ai, tự đứng qua một bên nhường đường cho người kia mà không tranh đấu, giành giựt lẫn nhau. Nếu một trong hai người bị buộc phải rút lui, thì có lẽ đó là ông Trương Tấn Sang. Nếu ông Sang không nắm chức Tổng Bí thư thì người thường được nhắc đến như là người có tiềm năng nắm lấy chức này là Chủ tịch Quốc hội Nguyễn Phú Trọng, người có khả năng hướng dẫn quốc hội đến chỗ ngày càng qủa quyết hơn, và ông Trọng cũng đã từng là bí thư thành ủy Hà Nội trước đây.

Bản tin mật của TĐS HK ở Việt Nam bị Wikileaks tiết lộ cũng tiên đoán nếu ông Trọng không nắm chức Tổng Bí thư đảng, thì một người có khuynh hướng giáo điều, trưởng ban Tuyên Giáo Trung ương của Đảng ông Tô Huy Rứa có thể nắm lấy chức vụ này. Chuyện có vẻ hơi bất thường vì ông Rứa mới được đưa vào Bộ Chính trị gần đây, nên khó có thể cho ông ta nhảy lên nắm chức Tổng Bí thư lần này. Tuy nhiên, tiểu sử ông Rứa rất đáng kể. Ông là ủy viên trung ương từ năm 2006, trưởng ban Tuyên Giáo Trung ương lâu đời, cựu Giám đốc Học viện Chính trị Quốc gia Hồ Chí Minh và cựu bí thư thành ủy Hải phòng nên được xem là người có “kinh nghiệm thực tiễn”, từng điều hành một thành phố cấp tỉnh. Vài trò của ông được báo chí nhà nước đề cập và đề cao nhiều trong thời gian sau này.

Hillary: Thợ ống nước
Nguồn: OntheNet

Đánh giá những nhân vật khác trong Bộ Chính trị, bản điện mật nói như sau trong đoạn 14. (C):

Nếu Dũng, ngược lại, không giữ được ghế thủ tướng của mình – và Sang nắm lấy chức Tổng Bí thư đảng – thì điều này có lẽ là ngược lại với sự cân bằng quyền lực địa phương thường lệ, nghĩa là với một người miền Bắc nắm chức Thủ tướng. Nhưng không có nhiều sự chọn lựa ở đây. Trong suốt 20 năm qua, Thủ tướng Việt Nam thường đi từ Phó Thủ tướng lên. Trong năm ông Phó Thủ tướng Việt Nam hiện nay, chỉ có ba ông nằm trong Bộ Chính trị, hai trong ba người này dự trù sẽ về hưu trong năm 2011, như thế chỉ còn lại ông Phó Thủ tướng Nguyễn Sinh Hùng. Hùng người Bắc và là một nhà kinh tế, và có thêm những thuận tiện để trở thành một trong những đối thủ đắng cay của Thủ tướng Dũng, theo nhiều nguồn tin khác nhau. Tuy nhiên, ông Hùng là người không được nổi tiếng và ưa chuộng lắm. Khi Quốc hội mới được bầu họp để phê chuẩn sự chọn lựa của đảng cho các chức vụ Thủ tướng, Phó Thủ tướng và các Bộ tưởng năm 2007 -- thường chỉ là một màn trình diễn chiếu lệ, cho có -- chỉ có 58 phần trăm đại biểu bỏ phiếu thuận cho ông Hùng, một con số thấp choáng người khi 92 phần trăm đại biểu Quốc hội cũng là đảng viên Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam.

Thực tế từ đại hội đảng đang diễn ra ở Hà Nội hiện nay cho thấy những tiên đoán của TĐS Hoa Kỳ - 14 tháng trước ngày đại hội đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam xảy ra - là tương đối chính xác.

© DCVOnline

Nguồn: US embassy cables: Vietnam picks its new leaders 12 Jan 2011: Cable sent: 10/09/2009, C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000809.

Thêm thông tin Wikileaks rò rỉ về Việt Nam

Ngoài dự báo liên quan tới chức Tổng Bí thư, điện tín của Sứ quán Mỹ tại Việt Nam mà Wikileaks rò rỉ đưa thêm nhiều thông tin về lãnh đạo và tình hình chính trị trong nước.

Bức điện ghi dấu Bảo mật của Đại sứ Michael Michalak đánh đi từ Hà Nội hồi tháng Chín năm ngoái viết bắt đầu từ giữa năm ngoái, cuộc chuẩn bị cho Đại hội Đảng XI đã được xúc tiến, với Hội nghị Trung ương 10 hoàn toàn tập trung vào công việc này. Hội nghị 9 trước đó đã bàn về nhân sự và chính sách đường lối.

Một tiểu ban chuẩn bị về nhân sự đã được thành lập, chính thức do Tổng Bí thư Nông Đức Mạnh chủ trì nhưng do ông Hồ Đức Việt, trưởng ban Tổ chức Trung ương, điều hành. Tiểu ban này có trọng trách đưa ra danh sách ứng viên cho Ban Chấp hành TW mới, và tiếp đó là Bộ Chính trị.
Quá trình chọn lựa lãnh đạo mới bắt đầu công bố chính thức torng dư luận từ hội nghị toàn quốc cuối tháng Tám 2010, khi lãnh đạo Đảng các địa phương được phổ biến yêu cầu tổ chức đại hội Đảng các cấp.
Đại sứ Mỹ tại Hà Nội cũng cung cấp chi tiết về giới hạn tuổi tác, đưa ra từ Đại hội IX (2011). Đó là 60 tuổi cho ủy viên Bộ Chính trị mới vào lần đầu và 65 cho người tái đắc cử.
Theo bức điện, giới hạn này đã được nới ra tại Đại hội X trong trường hợp ông Nông Đức Mạnh, người tái đắc cử vị trí tổng bí thư.
Tuy nhiên, Đại hội XI sẽ duy trì giới hạn tuổi tác và do vậy, năm chức ủy viên Bộ Chính trị của các ông Nông Đức Mạnh, Nguyễn Minh Triết, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Phạm Gia Khiêm và Trương Vĩnh Trọng sẽ cần có người thay thế.
Điện tín nhận xét, tuy vậy trong trường hợp ông Nguyễn Phú Trọng trúng cử chức tổng bí thư, thì ngoại lệ có thể xảy ra.
Ông Nguyễn Văn Chi, trưởng ban Kiểm tra Trung ương, được nói trong bức điện là "sức khỏe rất kém".

Cuộc đua vào vị trí đầu bảng

Hai ông Nguyễn Tấn Dũng và Trương Tấn Sang được nhắc tới một cách khá đồng thuận, là ứng cử viên sáng giá nhất cho vị trí tổng bí thư.
Ông Trương Tấn Sang, thường trực Ban Bí thư, chức vụ tương đương Phó Tổng Bí thư, là nhân vật vào thời điểm tháng 9/2010 được cho là có khả năng thay thế ông Nông Đức Mạnh hơn cả.
Bức điện của ông Michalak nói bản thân ông Mạnh thời gian gần đây đã rút lui khỏi việc làm quyết sách mà chuyển sang công tác xây dựng nội bộ Đảng.

Cho dù bị chỉ trích, ông thủ tướng đã hình thành một sự kiểm soát chặt chẽ hệ thống các cơ quan nhà nước. Quan trọng nữa, ông Dũng được sự ủng hộ mạnh mẽ của Bộ Công an và Bộ Quốc phòng, sự ủng hộ này dường như còn tăng lên trong đợt trấn áp bất đồng chính trị mới đây.

Điện tín rò rỉ trên Wikileaks

Bức điện dẫn lời Đại sứ Nhật Bản lúc đó là Mitsuo Sakaba, người tháp tùng ông Mạnh sang Nhật hồi tháng Tư, nói rằng ông tỏ ra khá hờ hững trong cuộc gặp Thủ tướng Nhật Taro Aso, không nói chuyện nhiều mà chỉ đọc bằng một giọng đều đều từ đầu đến cuối diễn văn dài 30 phút đã được trợ lý chuẩn bị trước.
Nhưng sau đó khi đi thăm một cơ sở nông nghiệp ở ngoại ô Tokyo thì trông ông sinh động hẳn lên.
Lý do có lẽ là, theo nhận định mà sứ quán Mỹ có, ông Sang đã đảm nhận nhiều công việc của ông Mạnh. (Báo Nhật Asahi trong một bài đầu năm 2011 được BBC giới thiệu cũng nói ông Trương Tấn Sang là nhân vật "thân Nhật Bản".)
Theo điện tín bị rò rỉ, nếu không vào vị trí T̉ông Bí thư, ông Nguyễn Tấn Dũng có nhiều khả năng giữ chức Thủ tướng thêm một nhiệm kỳ.
"Thực tế, đây có thể là mục tiêu của ông bấy lâu nay."
"Cho dù bị chỉ trích, ông thủ tướng đã hình thành một sự kiểm soát chặt chẽ hệ thống các cơ quan nhà nước. Quan trọng nữa, ông Dũng được sự ủng hộ mạnh mẽ của Bộ Công an và Bộ Quốc phòng, sự ủng hộ này dường như còn tăng lên trong đợt trấn áp bất đồng chính trị mới đây".
Bức điện cũng nhắc tới việc trong những tháng trước đó, báo chí đăng tải rộng rãi việc ông Nguyễn Tấn Dũng đã đi thăm một số quân khu và phát biểu tại nhiều buổi họp của Bộ Công an.
"Ông Dũng cũng có quan hệ rất thân chặt với Bộ trưởng Công an Lê Hồng Anh."

Nhân vật gây bất ngờ

Bức điện nói nếu dự đoán về hai ông Dũng-Sang mà trở thành hiện thực, thì đây sẽ là lần đầu tiên người miền Nam giữ hai vị trí quan trọng nhất của Đảng và Chính phủ.
Kể từ khi Tổng Bí thư Lê Duẩn qua đời năm 1986, vị trí tổng bí thư luôn do người miền Bắc nắm, vị trí thủ tướng trong tay người miền Nam.
Tuy nhiên điện tín dẫn lời một số bình luận gia cho rằng tính chất vùng miền càng ngày càng ít quan trọng, và ngay trong giới người miền Nam cũng có chia rẽ. Thí dụ ba ông Triết, Sang, Dũng đều từng làm lãnh đạo Đảng TP Hồ Chí Minh nhưng không nhất thiết họ là đồng minh của nhau.
"Song đánh giá của chúng tôi là việc hai vị trí thủ tướng và chủ tịch nước vào tay người miền Nam hồi năm 2006 đã khiến một số người miền Bắc vô cùng bức xúc."
"Mất cả hai chức tổng bí thư và thủ tướng (cho người miền Nam) là điều nhiều người không thể chấp nhận được."
Bức điện viết điều quan trọng cần nhớ là trong khi "chủ nghĩa vùng miền có thể gây chia rẽ, sự chia rẽ này càng ngày càng mất đi tính ý thức hệ mà chủ yếu về quyền lực, sự bảo trợ và tiền của."

Ông Nguyễn Sinh Hùng (bìa trái) trong cuộc họp Quốc hội

Ông Nguyễn Sinh Hùng liệu có gây bất ngờ?

Nhận định của sứ quán Mỹ là hai ông Sang và Dũng đều sẽ "không dễ bị loại ra khỏi cuộc đua" nhưng "nếu ai đó bị buộc phải từ bỏ tham vọng, thì có lẽ đó là ông Trương Tấn Sang".
Bức điện nhắc tới hai nhân vật được cho là có khả năng vào chức tổng bí thư trong trường hợp đó - Nguyễn Phú Trọng và Tô Huy Rứa.
Còn nếu trong trường hợp ông Sang thắng thế trở thành tổng bí thư, thì chức thủ tướng có thể vào tay một người miền Bắc.
Số người phù hợp cho vị trí này từ nhóm người miền Bắc trong Bộ Chính trị còn ít hơn.
"Trong 20 năm qua, chức thủ tướng Việt Nam luôn được lấy từ các phó thủ tướng đương nhiệm. Trong số năm phó thủ tướng hoện nay chỉ có ba ông là ủy viên Bộ Chính trị."
"Trong ba ông đó, hai ông sẽ nghỉ hưu năm 2011, còn lại duy nhất Phó Thủ tướng Thường trực Nguyễn Sinh Hùng".
Điện tín của sứ quán Mỹ viết ông Hùng là người miền Bắc, nhân vật kỹ trị về kinh tế và là người ganh đua lâu nay với Thủ tướng Dũng.
"Thế nhưng bản thân ông Hùng cũng không được lòng nhiều người. Khi Quốc hội mới họp năm 2007 để chính thức bổ nhiệm các chức vụ trong Chính phủ, ông Nguyễn Sinh Hùng chỉ được 58% phiếu bầu, quá thấp nhất là khi 92% số đại biểu Quốc hội là Đảng viên Cộng sản.

- Wikileaks: Tiên đoán về tân lãnh đạo Việt Nam BBC

Hai ông Nguyễn Tấn Dũng và Trương Tấn Sang có nhiều khả năng nắm giữ chức vụ cao nhất trong Đảng và Chính phủ, theo báo cáo của Sứ quán Mỹ do Wikileaks tiết lộ.

Hai ứng viên có sức mạnh ngang

ngửa cho chức vụ Tổng bí thư

Wikileaks vừa công bố bức điện của Đại sứ Mỹ tại Hà Nội, Michael Michalak, bình luận về ban lãnh đạo mới của Việt Nam sau đại hội Đảng.

Khi mà có đến 6 trong số 15 ủy viên Bộ chính trị dự kiến về hưu thì, ''Thường trực Ban bí thư Trương Tấn Sang và Thủ tướng Nguyễn Tấn Dũng là hai ứng viên hàng đầu để thay Tổng Bí thư Nông Đức Mạnh,'' theo bức điện mà Bấm Wikileaks tiết lộ về Việt Nam.
Vào Bộ chính trị từ năm 1996 cả ông Dũng và ông Sang đầu có nhiều ảnh hưởng trong Đảng - Chính phủ, và ''có lẽ là hai nhân vật chính trị có nhiều quyền lực nhất ở Việt Nam''.

Vấn đề là hai ông đều là người miền Nam do vậy người ta đoán có lẻ ông Sang sẽ bị loại theo qui ước chân vạc ba miền.
Nếu ông Dũng không đứng đầu Đảng thì có nhiều khả năng ông sẽ ngồi lại ghế thủ tướng.
Trong trường hợp đó, hai ứng viên mạnh khác là Chủ tịch quốc hội Nguyễn Phú Trọng, và ủy viên mới nhất của Bộ Chính trị là Trưởng ban Văn hóa Tư tưởng, Tô Huy Rứa, bức điện viết.
Đại sứ Mỹ nhận xét ông Dũng và ông Sang không chuộng cải cách chính trị như là cố Thủ tướng Võ Văn Kiệt, nhưng mọi người biết họ ''thực dụng, theo kinh tế thị trường, và đều muốn có thêm những bước tiến trong quan hệ với Hoa Kỳ''.
Bức điện đánh giá ông Trọng cũng tương tự, nhưng ông Rứa thì hoàn toàn khác vì việc ông được vào Bộ chính trị ''phản ánh và khẳng định khuynh hướng bảo thủ''.
''Vai trò của ông trong tiến trình chuyển đổi lãnh đạo của Việt Nam sẽ cho thấy sự tự do hóa chính trị - hiện đang ngưng - có được tiếp tục sau 2011, hay sẽ vẫn bị bóp nghẹt.''
Ngày càng già
Độ tuổi tối đa 67 (tăng từ 65 ngay trước Đại hội X) có lẽ sẽ được áp dụng tại đại hội lần này, theo các nguồn tin của Sứ quán Mỹ.
Nếu vậy các ông Nông Đức Mạnh (71t), Chủ tịch Nước Nguyễn Minh Triết (69t), Phó Thủ tướng Phạm Gia Khiêm (67t), Phó Thủ tướng Trương Vĩnh Trọng (67t) sẽ về hưu và người ta phải quyết định trường hợp của ông Nguyễn Phú Trọng (67t) nếu bầu ông là Tổng Bí thư.
Cho chức vụ cao nhất trong đảng này, thì ông Dũng và ông Sang ngang ngửa nhau trong Bộ chính trị, nhưng người ta nhắc nhiều đến ông Sang hơn, theo bình luận của Đại sứ Mỹ.
Trong tư cách Thường trực Ban bí thư, ông Sang trông coi công chuyện hàng ngày của đảng, nhờ vậy ''củng cố được vị thế trong Ban chấp hàng trung ương''.
Mặc dù phần nào mang tiếng trong vụ án Năm Cam, ông Sang được cho là ''người môi giới quyền lực chủ yếu của Đảng trong nhiều lĩnh vực, kể cả trong kinh tế,'' bức điện viết.
Một số nguồn tin của Sứ quán Mỹ nói ông Sang trên thực tế đã bắt đầu thay thế Tổng bí thư.
Cũng theo bức điện, một số nguồn tin khác nghĩ ông Mạnh từ một thời gian qua vẫn ở vị trí chỉ huy nhưng không quyết định chính sách mà đã chuyển sang công tác xây dựng đảng.
Trong khi đó, tham vọng làm Tổng bí thư của ông Dũng đã bị ảnh hưởng sau những chỉ trích về chủ trương khai thác bauxite, Đại sứ Mỹ nhận định.
''Tuy vậy đa số các nguồn tin nghĩ rằng ông Dũng trong vị thế tốt để duy trì ghế thủ tướng,'' theo nội dung bức điện mà Wikileaks tiết lộ và được báo The Guardian ở Anh công bố đúng ngày Đ̣ai hội XI khai mạc 12/1/2011.

Toàn văn bức điện đăng trên The Guardian (tiếng Anh)

-Wikileaks về Việt Nam Đông A
Đúng như linh cảm của tôi từ trước, Wikileaks bắt đầu công bố cable về Việt Nam đúng vào hôm khai mạc Đại hội Đảng toàn quốc XI. Hai cable công bố hôm nay chưa có thông tin động trời: một cable phân tích và dự báo lãnh đạo tiếp theo của Việt Nam, còn cable kia về tình hình xã hội trị an. Liệu Wikileaks có những thông tin động trời, làm thay đổi một số cơ cấu trong hàng ngũ lãnh đạo cấp cao như từng xảy ra với trường hợp của ông Nguyễn Hà Phan không? Điều này thật khó tiên đoán, nhưng sẽ rất trớ trêu nếu vừa bầu bán xong thì Wikileaks tung tin ra và sẽ phải xử lý như thế nào? Đợi chờ và xem thôi!

- US embassy cables: Vietnam picks its new leaders

Wednesday 12 January 2011 12.14 GMT

Summary

The US ambassador makes his predictions for the all-important Vietnamese Communist party conference and runs the rule over those jockeying for preeminence.

CO N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000809 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/10 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ECON, ETRD, VM SUBJECT: 2011 LEADERSHIP TRANSITION: LEADING CONTENDERS FOR GENERAL SECRETARY AND PRIME MINISTER REF: HANOI 60 (FEW CHANGES AT THE 9TH PARTH PLENUM) HANOI 330 (IDEOLOGY RESURGENT? THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S NEW CONCEPT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS) HANOI 413 (IN VIETNAM, CHINA AND BAUXITE DON'T MIX) HANOI 537 (BAUXITE CONTROVERSY SPURS LEADERSHIP DIVISIONS, VIBRANT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE) HANOI 672 (BEHIND VIETNAM'S LATEST CRACKDOWN) CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Michalak, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Preparations are already underway for major leadership changes in Vietnam as the Communist Party gears up for its Eleventh Party Congress in January 2011. As many as six of the Politburo's fifteen members are expected to retire, including the General Secretary, State President, and National Assembly Chair. Conventional wisdom identifies CPV Standing Secretary Truong Tan Sang and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung as the frontrunners to replace Nong Duc Manh as General Secretary. If Dung does not become General Secretary, odds are he will remain as Prime Minister. Politburo members since 1996, Dung and Sang have amassed unparalleled influence in Vietnam's Party-state apparatus; they are arguably the two most powerful political figures in the country today. The problem is that, though rivals, Dung and Sang are also too alike for comfort -- both are Southerners, both former HCMC Party Secretaries. Vietnam's enduring regionalism argues that one, likely Sang, will be frustrated in 2011. If Dung keeps his seat as PM, the two strongest contenders for General Secretary are current National Assembly Chair Nguyen Phu Trong and -- more radically -- the Politburo's newest member, the conservative head of the CPV Ideology and Education Commission, To Huy Rua. 2. (C) COMMENT: Neither PM Dung nor Standing Secretary Sang is a champion of political reform in the manner of the late PM Vo Van Kiet. But they are known commodities: pragmatic, market-oriented, and in favor of steady, incremental advances in Vietnam's relationship with the United States. Trong has adopted a similar approach as NA Chair. Rua may be a different story altogether. His elevation to the Politburo both reflects and reinforces a hard-line trend that has been increasingly evident since the crackdown on journalists reporting on the PMU-18 corruption scandal almost exactly one year ago. What role he plays in Vietnam's leadership transition will say much about whether political liberalization -- on hold for now -- will resume after 2011 or will remain stifled. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. Preparations Underway for the 2011 Party Congress --------------------------------------------- ---- 3. (C) Unlike the Ninth Party Plenum, which installed new members of the CPV Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee (ref. A), the Tenth Plenum, held this July, produced virtually no new personnel or policy decisions. Instead, according to contacts with access to the Central Committee, the Plenum focused mainly on preparations for the Eleventh Party Congress in 2011. Following the Plenum, the CPV announced that the once-every-five-year Congress would be held January 2011, a somewhat earlier date than usual to allow for National Assembly elections later in the year. More importantly, our contacts said that the Congress finished assignments to various subcommittees, including bodies responsible for drafting the Congress's main written product, the "Political Report." Initial drafting on some of the sections, including the portion on Vietnam's foreign relations, began several months ago, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. 4. (C) Of the subcommittees, the one subject to most fervid speculation is the Subcommittee for Personnel Appointments. Chaired officially by General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, but under the day-to-day supervision of the Central Committee's Organizational Affairs Department Chair, Ho Duc Viet, this subcommittee is charged with preparing the list of candidates for the Eleventh Central Committee and, ultimately, the next Politburo. Viet began the formal process at a "national conference" in Hanoi, August 25-26, in which he instructed grass-roots cadres to begin organizing local and Provincial- level Party Congresses. The actual work of the Appointments Subcommittee is kept extremely HANOI 00000809 002 OF 004 close hold, particularly as it affects upper-level personnel, and will be subject to change until the Tenth Central Committee's final plenary session, immediately before the January 2011 Congress itself. As a sign that ideological conservatives continue to consolidate their position, the Subcommittee will take as its guidance directives put forward in the Ninth Plenum, including admonitions about the pernicious effects of Western-oriented "self-evolution" (ref. B), sources familiar with the Plenum's internal deliberations say. Additionally, the Tenth Plenum instructed Provincial Party Secretaries to compile reports explaining how changes over the past ten years had either contributed to "perfecting socialism" or "regressing into capitalism," according to the new Can Tho Party Secretary. Retirements Will Leave Key Openings ---------------------------------- 5. (SBU) The Personnel Subcommittee will have several important vacancies to consider. The CPV's Ninth Congress (2001) established an age limit of 60 for first-time Politburo members and 65 for those returning for a repeat term. The latter limit was increased to 67 just prior to the Tenth Congress as an exception to allow Manh, who at the time was 66, to return as General Secretary. Nearly all of our contacts predicted the present leadership would adhere to these age limits in 2011. If the limits are respected, five key Politburo members face mandatory retirement: General Secretary Manh (age 71 in 2011), State President Nguyen Minh Triet (69), National Assembly Chair Nguyen Phu Trong (67), DPM and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem (67), and DPM Truong Vinh Trong (69). In addition, a sixth member of the Politburo, CPV Inspection Commission Chair Nguyen Van Chi, will be 66 and is reported to be in extremely poor health. A minority view among our contacts held that the 67-year age exception would be extended to NA Chair Trong if he were selected as General Secretary. Consensus Front Runners: Truong Tan Sang and Nguyen Tan Dung --------------------------------------------- --------------- 6. (C) Most observers identify PM Nguyen Tan Dung and the head of the powerful CPV Secretariat, Standing Secretary Truong Tan Sang, as the leading contenders for Secretary General in 2011. In terms of experience, authority, and potential career longevity, Dung and Sang stand head and shoulders above their counterparts on the Politburo. Both have achieved dominant positions in what many now consider almost as competing wings within the Party- state apparatus: Dung through the Office of Government, government ministries, and his control over Vietnam's largest state-owned enterprises; Sang through the Central Committee Commissions. Dung and Sang are also in the best position to provide the continuity of leadership that the Party has consistently said it needs. The two entered the Politburo in 1996, which gives them the longest tenure of any member likely to serve through 2011. At the same time, at 60, they are relatively young and would be eligible to serve two terms as General Secretary, were the 67-year age-limit exemption invoked. 7. (C) Of the two, Sang is more frequently mentioned as a replacement for GS Manh. As Standing Secretary, Sang is responsible for the day-to-day running of Party affairs and, our contacts say, has consolidated his hold over the CPV's Central Committee commissions, which retain an important role in setting broad policy goals and in personnel decisions. Though his tenure as HCMC Party Chief was somewhat tainted by the "Nam Cam" organized crime scandal, Sang is now widely acknowledged as the Party's primary power broker on a wide range of issues, including on economic matters. Meeting with a delegation of industry representatives from the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council in May, for example, Sang was able to comment authoritatively, in detail and without notes, on topics ranging from civilian nuclear cooperation to energy pricing to regulations on tenders and procurement. Sang has also intervened to stop, at least temporarily, several business HANOI 00000809 003 OF 004 deals that were rumored to be corrupt and that had aroused public criticism. 8. (C) Sang has in some respects already eclipsed the General Secretary, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. Others agree that Manh has ceded authority to Sang, but offer a slightly different interpretation. XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that Manh himself remains in overall command, but has removed himself from most policy decisions, choosing instead to focus on internal Party building. Ambassador Mitsuo Sakaba, who accompanied Manh on his April visit to Japan, told us that the General Secretary appeared disengaged in his meeting with Japanese PM Taro Aso, reading verbatim and in a monotone a 30-minute prepared statement passed to him by a staff-member; the General Secretary only really showed interest when he was taken to an agricultural site outside Tokyo. Whatever the cause of Manh's detachment, our contacts agree that Sang has already assumed many of Manh's normal responsibilities as General Secretary. 9. (C) While PM Dung has frequently been mentioned as a contender for General Secretary, a series of setbacks may have frustrated his ambitions to ascend to the top spot. Dung appears to have been stung by criticisms over his early advocacy for Chinese investment in bauxite projects in the Central Highlands (ref. C), a controversy that has been led publicly by General Vo Nguyen Giap, but which insiders say has been exploited by Sang and others as a proxy to undermine Dung (ref. D). In the most recent Plenum, the Prime Minister reportedly also came under criticism for his government's poor performance on corruption, education, and health care. Ultimately, Dung's biggest weakness is the simple fact that his power base derives from efforts to strengthen the government/ state, according to contacts such as XXXXXXXXXXXX. Dung's efforts to consolidate power within the Office of Government have alienated many in the Secretariat and the commissions of the Central Committee, the CPV's traditional centers of power, according to Eastern European diplomatic contacts with regular exposure to the upper/middle ranks of the CPV hierarchy. 10. (C) Nevertheless, most contacts suggest that Dung remains well positioned to remain Prime Minister; indeed, this may have been his goal all along. Though stung by criticism, the Prime Minister has developed an unprecedentedly tight hold over the state bureaucracy. Just as critically, Dung -- a former wartime military medic and police official -- retains strong backing within the Ministries of Public Security and Defense, support that has likely only been reinforced during the most recent crackdown on political dissent (ref E). Perhaps as an effort to showcase this, Dung has over the past months made several well-publicized visits to military commands and has addressed MPS functions. Dung also maintains extremely close contacts with MPS Minister Le Hong Anh, though Anh may not continue in his present position past 2011 (septel). Regionalism: Why the Conventional Wisdom Might be Wrong --------------------------------------------- ---------- 11. (C) If conventional wisdom prevails, Southerners would for the first time occupy the two most important positions in Vietnam's Party-state structure, and would be in a position to keep their jobs for an additional ten years -- an untenable situation from the standpoint of the CPV's traditional power brokers in the North. Since Party strongman Le Duan's death in 1986, the General Secretary has always come from the North, the Prime Minister from the South; there has been an additional effort, less consistently applied, to have the third position in Vietnam's traditional power troika, State President, come from the Center. XXXXXXXXXXXX argue that regionalism is less and less correlated with ideological differences and of late has HANOI 00000809 004 OF 004 faded in importance. Additionally, XXXXXXXXXXXX and others maintain, there are important factional divisions among Southerners themselves: Sang, Dung, and State President Triet may all be former HCMC Party Chiefs, but they are not necessarily allies. There is much truth to this; however, our assessment is that having both the PM and President come from the South was an extremely hard pill for many Northerners to swallow in 2006, made palatable only because the top spot was held by a Northerner. Losing the positions of both General Secretary and Prime Minister would be too much for some to contemplate. (Comment: It is also important to keep in mind that factionalism, of which regionalism remains the most potent fault line, increasingly is no longer about ideology -- it is about power, patronage, and wealth. End comment.) The Dark-Horse Contenders ------------------------- 12. (C) Neither Sang nor Dung is likely to step aside without a struggle. If one is forced to sacrifice his ambitions, it is likely to be Sang. If Sang does not become General Secretary, a frequently mentioned alternative could be National Assembly Chair Nguyen Phu Trong, who has ably managed Vietnam's increasingly assertive national legislature and is a known commodity, having also served credibly as Hanoi Party Secretary. XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that Trong is lobbying to have the 67 limit apply not just to the position of General Secretary, but to each of the "four pillars": GS, PM, State Secretary, and NA Chair. 13. (C) A more radical choice could be the newest Politburo member, the hard-line chair of the CPV Ideology and Educational Commission (IEC) To Huy Rua. It would be unusual for a recently appointed Politburo member to ascend to the top of the CPV apparatus so soon; however, Rua has developed a formidable curriculum vitae. Rua has been a member of the Secretariat since 2006, which puts him at the heart of CPV policy making; as the long-serving IEC Chair and as a former head of the Ho Chi Minh Political Academy, he has impeccable ideological credentials; and, perhaps most importantly, as the former Party Chair for Haiphong, Rua has "executive experience" running a major provincial-level city. We have no information to corroborate an assertion by Australian academic Carlye Thayer that Rua is an ally of Sang. Rather, Rua is considered to be a protege of fellow Thanh Hoa stalwart, the hard-line former General Secretary Le Kha Phieu. Whatever the case, Rua's public profile has risen appreciably in the weeks after the most recent Plenum. On August 3, for example, Rua's views on "self-evolution" made the front-page piece in the leading CPV daily, Nhan Dan. On August 30, state media lavished extensive coverage on his visit to HCMC, where he exhorted the country's youth to follow the example of Ho Chi Minh. Rua was also shown chairing regional organizing meetings laying the groundwork for provincial Party Congresses. 14. (C) If Dung, on the other hand, is unable to retain his seat -- and Sang, in turn, ascends to the position of General Secretary -- this would likely produce a reversal of the normal regional balance, with a Northerner becoming Prime Minister. But here the field is, if anything, even narrower. For the past 20 years, Vietnam's Prime Ministers have come from the ranks of serving Deputy Prime Minister: of Vietnam's five current DPMs, only three are on the Politburo, and of them, two are scheduled to retire in 2011, leaving only Standing DPM Nguyen Sing Hung. Hung is a Northerner and an economic technocrat, and has the additional advantage of being one of PM Dung's bitterest rivals, according to several contacts. However, Hung is himself an unpopular figure. When the newly convened National Assembly met in 2007 to formally ratify the Party's selections for PM, DPMs, and government ministers -- normally a perfunctory ritual -- only 58% voted to approve DPM Hung, a shockingly low figure considering that 92% of the NA's deputies are Party members. ------------- US embassy cables: Concerns over Vietnamese crackdown

Wednesday 12 January 2011 12.12 GMT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000007 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, DRL/IRF AND DRL/AWH E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/20 TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, KIRF, HURI, PREL, VM SUBJECT: Vietnam Religious Freedom Update - The Case Against CPC

Summary

The US ambassador in Hanoi notes that land disputes in Vietnam are setting party against people. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

Re-Designation REF: A) HANOI 5; HANOI 3; 09 HANOI 1398; 09 HANOI 1202; 09 HANOI 1182 09 HANOI 1084; 09 HANOI 873; 09 HANOI 859; 09 HANOI 839; 09 HANOI 713 09 HANOI 695; 09 HANOI 694 CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Michalak, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Vietnam's poor handling of the situations at the Plum Village Community at the Bat Nha Pagoda and the Dong Chiem Catholic parish last week — particularly the excessive use of violence — is troublesome and indicative of a larger GVN crackdown on human rights in the run-up to the January 2011 Party Congress. However, these situations are primarily "land disputes," do not meet the statutory requirement in the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act, and should not divert our attention from the significant gains in expanding religious freedoms that Vietnam has made since the lifting of CPC designation in November 2006. These gains include increased recognition and registration of scores of new religions, implementation of a new legal framework on religion, and training programs at the local and national level. Catholic and Protestant communities, including those in the North and Northwest Highlands, continue to report improvements, as do members of the Muslim, Baha'i, and Cao Dai faiths throughout Vietnam. The widespread, systematic religious persecution that existed prior to Vietnam's designation in 2004 does not exist anymore. Post therefore recommends that the Department not re designate Vietnam and instead use high-level engagement opportunities to press the GVN to continue to expand religious freedom in Vietnam. END SUMMARY. Conditions Prior to CPC Designation ----------------------------------- 2. (C) Prior to the designation of Vietnam as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) in 2004, the Vietnamese government's repression of certain religious groups and their followers was systematic and widespread, and official interference with religious activities was the norm. The U.S. Government had a list of 45 individuals imprisoned because of their religious belief — including members of the Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai faiths. Thousands of Central Highland villagers and other ethnic minorities were restricted from practicing their religion and many were forced to renounce their faith. Religious believers were often subjected to harassment and physical abuse. In 2001, the government forced the closure of nearly all unrecognized Protestant congregations and meeting points in the Central Highlands. 3. (C) The Vietnamese government, moreover, limited the intake of new seminarians and the ordination of new priests to numbers well below the necessary "replacement rate" for the Catholic Church. The government also did not support the Church's participation in humanitarian activities such as the fight against HIV/AIDS. Church requests for the creation of new dioceses, the formation of a new seminary and the appointment of new bishops also languished in the absence of formal GVN approval. Improvements Prior to Lifting of CPC Designation --------------------------------------------- --- 4. (C) After Vietnam's designation as a CPC in 2004, DRL/IRF and the Embassy created a roadmap to assist Vietnam in lifting the designation. In 2004 and 2005 — just two years' time — the Vietnamese government introduced sweeping changes to its religious freedom policy by implementing a new legal framework on religion that bans forced renunciation, grants citizens the right to freedom HANOI 00000007 002 OF 004 of belief and religion, as well as the freedom not to follow a religion, and prohibits violations of these freedoms. The government conducted many training programs to assure uniform compliance of the new legal framework at the provincial, district, commune, and village levels. Central government officials began responding to complaints from religious leaders about their treatment at the grassroots level. Protestants across the north also reported improvement in officials' attitudes towards their religions and practice. 5. (C) In the North and Northwest Highlands, Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, and the government itself reported an increase in religious activity and observance. Nearly 1000 Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam (SECV) "meeting points" and places of worship affiliated with other religious organizations in the Central Highlands were registered, including in Gia Lai province where registrations effectively legalized operations for 75,000 believers in the province. 76 SECV congregations were recognized in the Central Highlands and were engaged in regular religious activities. 29 Evangelical Church of Vietnam (ECVN) congregations were registered in the North and Northwest Highlands. 6. (C) The new legal framework allowed for the training of hundreds of new Protestant and Catholic clergy members, including 71 SECV pastors in the Central Highlands. 57 Catholic priests were ordained in a mass public ceremony in Hanoi. Other Catholic priests, including nine in the Dak Lak diocese, were ordained throughout the country. A new SECV Christian training center was approved and opened in Ho Chi Minh City and a new seminary was opened by the Catholic Church in 2006. 7. (C) Throughout the country, including the Central and Northwest Highlands, officially-recognized religious organizations reported that they were able to operate openly, and followers of these religions report that they were able to worship without harassment. Other non-recognized religions, such as the Baha'i faith, reported that their followers did not face harassment and that the authorities facilitated the legalization of their activities. Finally, all individuals raised by the United States as prisoners of concern for reasons connected to their faith were released as of September 2006. Improvements since Lifting CPC Designation (November 2006) --------------------------------------------- ------------- 8. (C) While implementation of the legal framework has been uneven, the pace of progress continues to be swift. Since 2006, the GOV issued national-level recognition or registration to the following churches: Seventh Day Adventists, Grace Baptist Church, Bani Muslim Sect, Vietnam Baptist Convention (Southern Baptist), Baha'i Faith, Vietnam Mennonite Church, Assemblies of God, United World Mission Church, Pure Land Buddhist Home Practice Association, Vietnam Presbyterian Church, Vietnam Christian Fellowship, the Bani Muslim Sect, Threefold Enlightened Truth Path, the Threefold Southern Tradition, Mysterious Fragrance from Precious Mountains, and the Four Gratitudes. 9. (C) Ho Chi Minh City has registered at least 91 Protestant house churches, serving 7,225 parishioners from many different denominations established before and after 1975. These groups include Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, LDS Church, Assemblies of God and the United Gospel Outreach Church. Additionally, all meeting points that had been closed in the Central Highlands have since been reopened, totaling over 1,700 meeting points and 150 registered congregations. The SECV has also opened scores of new churches with the assistance of Central Highlands' authorities in Gia Lai, Dak Lak, and Dak Nong provinces. The SECV has confirmed that training classes for pastors in Dak Lak and Gia Lai are ongoing and that hundreds of new pastors have been ordained and assigned to newly-registered meeting points. The SECV has reported that a previous shortage of pastors HANOI 00000007 003 OF 004 in the Central Highlands no longer exists. 10. (C) Additional churches were registered in the Northwest Highlands bringing the total ECVN registered congregations in the region to 168. The ECVN was allowed to build its first new church in decades in Lang Son Province in November 2008. The Church houses an ethnic minority Red Dzao congregation, but will also conduct services for a recently established and newly registered ethnic H'mong congregations. During the past few years, members of Mission Vietnam and foreign visitors, both official and religious, have witnessed religious ceremonies involving thousands of Christians, Catholics and Buddhists, as well as Vietnam's indigenous religions, such as the Cao Dai. 11. (C) Ongoing land disputes notwithstanding, the Catholic Church continues to report that its ability to gather and to worship has improved, and restrictions have eased on the assignment of clergy. During the 2007 visit of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, one Catholic priest told Commissioners that in the past, the Church had to wait for explicit approval from the GVN before moving forward with the appointment of clergy. Now, the Church submits names and the GVN has 30 days to voice its disapproval. The priest said the GVN objected in only one instance, and since the objection came after the 30 days had passed, the Church proceeded with their choice without repercussions. In 2008, the GVN approved the establishment of an additional Catholic seminary and the GVN no longer restricts the number of students entering seminary each year. In April 2008, government officials returned the La Vang church and pilgrimage center, the most important Catholic pilgrimage site in the country. The GVN also has also relaxed its stance against Church efforts to involve itself in the fight against HIV/AIDS and other social work activities, a process we are encouraging. In December 2009, State President Nguyen Minh Triet met with Pope Benedict XVI in Vatican City for a meeting that the Vatican characterized as a "significant event in the progress of bilateral relations with Vietnam." Since 2006, the Vatican and Vietnam have exchanged a number of delegations, including a January 2007 visit by PM Nguyen Tan Dung, and created a Joint Working Group on reestablishing relations that met for the first time in February 2009. More Needs to be Done --------------------- 12. (C) Vietnam's improving record on religious freedom has been tarred by the recent violence against Catholics in Dong Chiem and the forced eviction of nearly 400 monks and nuns affiliated with Thich Nhat Hanh's Plum Village Order from first the Bat Nha Pagoda and later the Phuoc Hue Pagoda both in Lam Dong Province. These evictions, and the violence associated with them, were preceded by months of intimidation and physical attacks. Vietnam has been slow to acknowledge the damage caused by the Lang Mai/Bat Nha dispute, with the GVN repeating the now standard line that the incidents reflected a convoluted intra- Buddhist disagreement. As religious freedom progresses in Vietnam, religious groups are increasingly demanding more from the government than the right to worship freely -- including the desire to be more involved in charitable activities and seeking resolution to longstanding property disputes. Vietnam's single- Party-dominated state still draws the line at any co-mingling of religion with politics. This explains not only Vietnam's very rough treatment of leading political dissident and BLOC 8406 cofounder Father Nguyen Van Ly, as well as the GVN's approach to the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam and the so-called "Dega Protestant Church" in the Central Highlands. Additional areas that need improvement include the slow pace of registrations of Protestant congregations in the Northwest Highlands and the lack of approval of a H'mong translation of the Bible. Isolated incidents of harassment of Christians; and while illegal, the occasional forced renunciation of faith, also continue in far-flung areas. Comment HANOI 00000007 004 OF 004 ------- 13. (C) The GVN is coming under pressure, justifiably, for its ham-fisted, at times brutish, handling of the situations in Bat Nha and Dong Chiem. As we saw with the large-scale Catholic protests a year ago in Hanoi and July 2009 in Quang Binh province (reftels), there are complicated historical and land use issues at play. Until the government develops a transparent, fair process for adjudicating land claims, disputes between the government and religious organizations will continue to fester and occasionally flair up. However, such incidents are largely land issues, not religious persecution. Furthermore, they do not approach the threshold established by the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act. Moreover, despite the continuing problems mentioned above, there are no indications that the GVN is backsliding on its commitment to register and recognize religious groups, a principle condition for the lifting of CPC in 2006. The GVN appears to be implementing its legal framework on religion that it codified in March 2005. END COMMENT.

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Thứ Hai, 17 tháng 1, 2011

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